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INTRO
SPINOZA’S GAY SCIENCE
Although The Gay Science is a book by Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Baruch Spinoza could have been the author of a book by the 
same title. The materialist joy that he describes in his Eth-
ics is an inspiration to all creative disciplines. Spinoza is not 
read as much as Deleuze and Foucault (to whom two other 
pamphlets are dedicated) yet his writings can help to develop 
a powerful artistic production. He refuses to think of a God 
that would be a creator, but rather celebrates a God creature, 
namely nature in its infinite substance of which every living 
and non-living body in the world is made. We ignore what a 
body can do, says Spinoza. Such ignorance is the key to cre-
ation as each manipulation of matter, each composition of its 
substance in various relations between the bodies, brings an 
incomplete answer to this question. Architecture through its 
materiality and Cinema through its vision of the world are two 
creative disciplines among others that can bring a Spinozist 
contribution to the field. Immanence is the key word here: no 
transcendental intervention, no deus ex-machina, only what 
is here, the matter and its continuous flow, assembling and 
disassembling bodies, creating biologies, animating anato-
mies with no other purpose than its celebration of their being. 
That is the true joy that Spinoza teaches us: we might not be 
as free as we think we are, but we are carried by forces that 
link the whole material world together.
8 / The Funambulist Pamphlets: Spinoza
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EPISODE 1: MARXIAN 
READING OF CAPITALISM 
THROUGH A SPINOZIST 
CONCEPTOLOGY
This section will attempt to show how 17th-century Portug-
ese-Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza can supply a termi-
nology, or rather a conceptology to extend the sharp analysis 
of capitalism made by Karl Marx in the 19th century to its 
neo-liberal version we have been experiencing for the last 
thirty years. In order to do so, I would use a particular chapter 
from the book Capitalisme, désir et servitude: Marx et Spinoza 
(Capitalism, Desire and Servitude, Marx and Spinoza) written 
by Frédéric Lordon and published by the always excellent La 
Fabrique in 2010.
In this book, F. Lordon depicts, among other things, two im-
portant paradigm shifts in capitalism that occurred since the 
publication of Das Kapital, in order for it to survive against 
the potentiality of a revolution prophetized by Marx when he 
was observing the continuous production of a discontented 
working class. The first paradigm shift, known as Fordism, 
occurred in the first part of the 20th century and consisted 
in a neat amplification of the production rhythm associated 
with the integration of the working class itself in the mass 
consumption of their own products. The second paradigm 
shift, closer to us, examined how the working class (which 
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also shifted, from industry to the service sector) could gain in 
productivity by integrating itself into an ideology of “self-ac-
complishment” that could apparently relate to the Spinozist 
idea of joyful affect (for a very basic introduction to his con-
cepts, read my 2010 text Architectures of Joy). For Spinoza, 
servitude is universal since all our acts are determined by the 
sum of circumstances that caused them, but we can never-
theless increase our power (potentia in Latin) by acquiring the 
knowledge of causes of our behavior. As we know all too well, 
strategies of inducing do not allow the subject to understand 
the context of his decisions any better than an assembly line 
worker understood his decisions in the beginning of the 20th 
century. Therefore, the subject is forced to remain within the 
sad affects.
So far, I was evoking the book in its entirety, but in order to be 
precise, I would like to examine more particularly one chapter 
entitled Alors le (ré)communisme! The neologism of (ré)com-
munisme is a French play on words insisting on the idea of 
revisiting communism, but more importantly on opposing the 
res publica (the public thing) to the res communa (the com-
mon thing) as two different models of society. It is interest-
ing to observe how F. Lordon is slowly introducing this new 
model: (the translation is mine but since the text is difficult to 
translate because of the multiple meanings that each impor-
tant word carries, original terms are in parenthesis)
The starting point was the following: someone 
wants to do something that requires several 
people to achieve. This community of action is 
in its very essence a political community if we at-
tribute political status to any situation that entails 
powers (puissance) of action . . . .  The question 
is, then, the constitution of this entrepreneurial 
political community. This implies the genetic di-
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mension of the mechanisms through which the 
community emerges, as well as the constitution-
ality of the formal layouts (agencements) that rule 
its function once it is assembled. What are the 
desirable relationships under which a company 
(entreprise) can be constituted when it is con-
ceived as an association of powers (puissance) 
of action?
While condemning the relationships of servitude created by 
capitalism, F. Lordon also introduces a form of doubt in the 
sacred equality enforced by communism in its orthodox ver-
sion (presented as the only alternative to capitalism for many 
years). His discourse is, of course, mostly focused on com-
panies; however, in order to make his point clearer, he uses 
the example of the creative process of a theater play. Here, 
I translated the ambivalent term entreprise (“company” and 
“project”) with the English word of enterprise that needs to be 
understood with these two simultaneous meanings as well):
A playwright comes with an amazing text: who 
would deny that his contribution is not of the same 
nature as that of the electricians and the costume 
designers? Who would contest the status of his 
power (puissance) as authentically creative? Yet, 
he needs electricians and costume designers for 
the show to take place and so that his genius text 
could be transmitted to the public. The problem 
is never tackled this way because the immediate 
solution brought by the wage relationships (rap-
port) in the form of a supplied hired manpower 
made us forget that there ever was a problem. 
To find its original meaning, we need to perform 
a thought experiment that consists in imagining 
what kind of political arrangements would have 
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to emerge so that the collective enterprise would 
be withdrawn from the structure of wage relation-
ships (rapport).
[...]
If the communist idea is essentially related to the 
notion of equality, the question is then to wonder 
what can be the nature of equality in the context 
of a substantial, recognized inequality of contri-
butions, and how not to deny the asymmetry of 
these situations in which the strength of an initial 
proposition makes the other contributions ap-
pear as auxiliary. Here is the communist equa-
tion: which form of equality can we realize in the 
context of the division of labor and its most nefari-
ous consequence, the fundamental separation 
between ‘concept’ and ‘execution’?
This latter point is important as it bring back Marx’s contempt 
for the strict division of work as it was implemented by the 
mass production of goods. F. Lordon later insists that, even 
in relatively ‘democratic’ working environments, it is rare to 
see a person who is sometimes in charge of the lights and 
some other times in charge of the play-writing. There is no 
real redistribution of the roles depending on the desire and 
inspiration of each person involved in the enterprise.
If the complete solution of the communist equa-
tion consists in a restructuration of the division of 
desire that redistributes the concept opportuni-
ties – and consequently the execution tasks, too 
– nobody indicated its limits better than Etienne 
Balibar its horizon (Spinozist as well as Marxian): 
“ To be as many as possible, to think as much as 
possible.”
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Finally, F. Lordon introduces his model of (ré)communisme 
as an alternative based on the principle above. He then de-
scribes an enterprise that would adopt this model as a work-
ing paradigm. His description recalls the Argentinean fábri-
cas recuperadas, factories taken over by workers when their 
owners wanted to liquidate them after the 2001 economical 
crisis. The new system setup by the workers involves a dem-
ocratic process of decision making and one salary across 
the board:.
Since they put a part of their life in an enterprise, 
its members can only exit the enrollment relation-
ship (rapport), born from a monarchical constitu-
tion (the imperium of the master-desire), by shar-
ing, beyond the object itself, the entire control 
of the conditions of the collective pursuit of the 
object, and finally by affirming the indisputable 
right to be fully associated with that which affects 
them all. What the productive enterprise has to 
fabricate, in what quantity, with what rhythm, what 
volume, what wage structure, what reattribution 
of the surplus, how will it accommodate varia-
tions in its environment: none of these things can 
be excepted from common deliberation since 
they all have common consequences. The very 
simple recommunist (récommuniste) principle is 
thus: what affects everyone should be the object 
of everyone, i.e. constitutionally and equally de-
bated by everyone.
To conclude, we may want to go back to where we started, 
the philosophy of Spinoza, by using its Deleuzian interpreta-
tion to explain the notion of freedom: there is no freedom, 
only forms of liberation. In other words, if we follow the writ-
ings of Spinoza absolutely (we might say, as diagrams), one 
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is never free, since one is subjected to a form of determinism. 
However (and maybe in a less orthodoxic reading), one can 
get involved in processes of liberation by participating in a 
power (potentia) that is ‘bigger’ than us. This power is called 
God (i.e. nature or the world, to put it maybe too simply) in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. However, in his political project, which 
is in complete agreement with his philosophy but founded 
on more pragmatic bases, this ‘bigger’ power can be more 
simply the harmonious composition of a collective enterprise. 
In F. Lordon’s interpretation of the latter, it might not be the 
strict equality, but rather the shared association of skills and 
desires, the regular shifting of roles, and the systematic ac-
cess to the decision process that allow this enterprise to exist 
and operate.
.....
Originally published on March 24th 2013
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EPISODE 2: SPINOZIST 
DETERMINISM OR HOW 
CAESAR COULD NOT HAVE 
NOT CROSSED THE RUBICON
The first of these concepts determinism, although it would 
be an anachronism to attribute this word to the Spinozist 
terminology. The idea behind the word is nonetheless the 
same, as Spinoza is convinced that nothing that happens 
could have possibly happened differently as each of these 
events, ‘minor’ though it may be, constitutes the result of 
the sum of circumstances that occurred in the world since 
its beginning. There is no theology in this philosophy -- or, 
at least, not a transcendental one in which destiny or God 
have planned a path for the world. This vision has more to 
do with a logical holistic chain of events. We can say that 
this chain is following the laws of physics, although the lat-
ter are of course an incomplete human interpretation (one 
might say a decoding) of the former.
As I stated in the previous chapter, there is therefore no 
freedom possible in the philosophy of Spinoza: we are con-
demned to be the object of the necessity of world events, 
just as in his famous example in the Ethics: a stone. No hu-
man would doubt the inability of a stone to act upon its will:
Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while con-
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tinuing in motion, should be capable of thinking 
and knowing, that it is endeavouring, as far as it 
can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being 
conscious merely of its own endeavour and not 
at all indifferent, would believe itself to be com-
pletely free, and would think that it continued in 
motion solely because of its own wish. This is 
that human freedom, which all boast that they 
possess, and which consists solely in the fact, 
that men are conscious of their own desire, but 
are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire 
has been determined.
[...] an infant believes that it desires milk freely; 
an angry child thinks he wishes freely for ven-
geance, a timid child thinks he wishes freely to 
run away. Again, a drunken man thinks, that from 
the free decision of his mind he speaks words, 
which afterwards, when sober, he would like to 
have left unsaid. So the delirious, the garrulous, 
and others of the same sort think that they act 
from the free decision of their mind, not that they 
are carried away by impulse.
We may interprets the philosophy of Spinoza as essentially 
pessimistic: we are carried by the stream of the causes that 
determines us. However, Spinoza is known as the philoso-
pher of joy, which might lead us to wonder if there is not a 
more positive way to interpret his work. Determinism allows 
us to get rid once and for all of every form of regret or re-
morse as worlds which would include different versions of 
history (one might think of Leibniz’s pyramid) are irrelevant 
. To imagine a different version would imply a change in the 
totality of the sum of events since the beginning of the world 
(beginning that might even be an illusion as well). To go 
back to the example of Leibniz who, in thought although 
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not in historical time, seems to some extent, to precede 
Spinoza: if Julius Caesar is crossing the Rubicon, it is not 
because God always chooses the most perfect world, but 
more simply because the totality of causes that preceded 
this historical event led to it with no other possible outcome.
It would be too easy to think that, in addition of forbidding 
regrets, Spinoza’s philosophy also withdraw the sense of 
responsibility for one’s actions. While regret consists in a 
passive interpretation of the past manifested by the impos-
sible wish that things should have happened differently, re-
sponsibility corresponds to the fact that we, as individuals, 
cannot escape from acting upon our lives (in other words, 
not doing anything would not extract us from determinism) 
and therefore should assume our responsibilities based on 
those actions and the illusion of free will.
Philosophically, what that means is that, even though we 
can never be free in the Cartesian sense, we can adopt an 
active attitude towards the determinist stream by under-
standing (always in a limited way) the causes that lead us 
to act the way we do. Politically and judicially (i.e. in a more 
pragmatic, imperfect model), this philosophy consists in 
the acknowledgement of the social context that conditions 
all events. Once again, the responsibility is the same but it 
helps us to address those same conditions as catalysts of 
behaviors and therefore react to them.
.....
Originally published on March 25th 2013
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EPISODE 3: POWER (POTENTIA) 
VS. POWER (POTESTAS) OR THE 
STORY OF A JOYFUL TYPHOON
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 3: DELEUZE]
Let’s continue to explore Spinozist ‘conceptology’ and focus 
on a distinction difficult to make in English where the word 
power includes -- and therefore erases the distinction be-
tween -- two meanings whose difference is fundamentalfor 
Spinoza. I will differentiate between two Latin terms, poten-
tia and potestas (in French, puissance and pouvoir). Savage 
Anomaly, written by Antonio Negri in 1981 when he was in 
prison, examines this complex question.. The original subtitle 
of this book is saggio su potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza 
(essay on potestas and potential in Baruch Spinoza). Unfor-
tunately, Michael Hardt, Negri’s friend and translator of the 
English version did not find a way to translate this directly and 
added a different subtitle, The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphys-
ics and Politics.
I first want to explain the difference between potestas and po-
tentia in a simple way by defining the former as a relationship 
to another body and the latter as a capacity or an intensity, 
to use a Deleuzian terminology. Potestas needs a referent to 
dominate or to be dominated by it. On the contrary, potentia 
is a relationship to the whole world (Spinoza might say God 
but since his god is immanent, this is the same thing) in the 
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composition of a form of “harmony”. In the Abécédaire (“J 
for Joy”), Deleuze helps us understand this distinction while 
explaining the concept of joy and sadness (my translation):
There is no bad power (puissance), instead we 
should say that what is bad is the lowest degree 
of power (puissance). And the lowest degree of 
power (puissance), is power (pouvoir). I mean, 
what is malice? Malice consists in preventing 
someone from doing what he can, malice con-
sists in preventing someone from doing, from ef-
fecting his power (puissance). Therefore, there is 
no bad power (puissance), there are malicious 
powers (pouvoirs). Perhaps all power (pouvoir) 
is malicious by nature. Maybe not, maybe it is too 
easy to say so… […] Power (pouvoir) is always 
an obstacle to the effecting of powers (puissanc-
es). I would say, all power (pouvoir) is sad. Yes, 
even if those who “have the power” (pouvoir) are 
very joyful to “have it”, it is a sad joy; there are 
sad joys. On the contrary, joy is the effecting of a 
power (puissance). Once again, I don’t know any 
power (puissance) that is malicious. The typhoon 
is a power (puissance), it enjoys itself in its very 
soul but…it does not enjoy because it destroys 
houses, it enjoys because it exists. To enjoy is to 
enjoy being what we are, I mean, to be “where 
we are”. Of course, it does not mean to be happy 
with ourselves, not at all. Joy is the pleasure of 
the conquest (conquête), as Nietzsche would 
say. But conquest in that sense does not mean 
to enslave people, of course. Conquest is, for 
example, for a painter to conquer color. Yes, that 
-- yes, that is a conquest, yeah, here, this is joy.
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In other words, and to go back to the notion of joy as we 
know it in a familiar sense, the moment of true joy that we 
probably all experienced one day (like Deleuze’s typhoon) 
occurs when everything around us and in us seems to con-
nect in a harmonious manner: what we see, what we hear, 
what we smell, how we feel, etc. Whoever experienced this 
feeling would have trouble imagining that such pure happi-
ness could occur when expressing a domination towards an-
other individual. Using the play on words that Deleuze almost 
suggests to us, the sad joy he evokes might be observed 
more particularly in Sade where pleasure is achieved through 
the absolute domination of one body over another. However, 
that pleasure in its “orgasmic” and violent characteristics 
does not seem to resonate within Spinoza’s concept of joy. 
The French word jouissance would probably be more appro-
priate, but here, again, the English language lacks a word to 
express it.
Let us go back to the Savage Anomaly and how A. Negri as-
sociates the philosophy of the Ethics (1677) with the more 
pragmatic (in the sense of Machiavelli) Theologico-Political 
Treatise (1670) and Political Treatise (1675). Negri’s thesis is 
that the two latter texts should not be interpreted the same 
way as Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), as it has been repeatedly 
done. While these two books presupposes a human nature 
(fundamentally bad in Hobbes, fundamentally good in Rous-
seau) and dramatizes a sort of mythical original event for 
which individuals would have ceded some of their rights to 
compose a society, Spinoza does not “dramatize” anything 
(and thus probably does not historicize anything either); he 
simply examines the relationships of the multitude with its 
government. For him, The State constitutes the multitude’s 
effectuation of its potentia. Whether the government is an em-
bodiment of The State or not is almost irrelevant. Of course, if 
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it is not an embodiment of The State, the multitude may over-
throw the government to replace it by another in an attempt to 
get closer to the expression of its collective produced desire.
Let us not forget, however, that the formulation of the multi-
tude’s desire often constitutes an imperfect understanding (if 
not, sometimes, a complete misunderstanding) of its poten-
tia since the latter is related to the whole world and cannot be 
fully articulated and expressed. Spinoza, who was horrified 
by the assassination of the De Witt Brothers by a crowd in 
1672, knew too well that the expression of the multitude’s 
desire has sometimes more to do with potestas than with po-
tentia. A legitimate political act would therefore constitute an 
act that would formulate its desire as close as possible to 
the essence of its potentia. Understanding the relation to the 
world is therefore a crucial point for our attempt to act politi-
cally, to be joyful.
.....
Originally published on March 26 2013
22 / The Funambulist Pamphlets: Spinoza
04
EPISODE 4: THE WORLD OF 
AFFECTS OR WHY ADAM GOT 
POISONED BY THE APPLE
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 3: DELEUZE]
The third chapter dedicated to the exploration of Spinoza’s 
conceptology will be, once again, influenced by Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Spinoza’s. Deleuze spent the first part of his 
career creating his own philosophy through interpreting oth-
ers (Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson). These interpretations are 
intensely personal. There are other ways of approaching the 
philosophy of Spinoza, but I am not as familiar with them.
We have not yet explored the concept of substance, which 
is for Spinoza the only and necessarily perfect thing that ex-
ists and that can be considered as a whole under the name 
‘God’. Expressed in a very simple way (maybe too simple), 
and borrowing Leibniz’s concept of monad, we see the world 
as a gigantic assemblage of infinitely small pieces of matter 
(calling them atoms would be erroneous but useful to make 
it understandable) that are all involved in a more or less fast 
movement. These small elements of matter compose bodies 
that are perpetually striving to persevere in being (Ethics, part 
3, prop. 6). This property is called conatus. These bodies are 
continuously interacting with each other and thus systemati-
cally affect each other. What it means in a very simple way is 
that when you cut a piece of butter with a knife, the knife af-
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fects the butter since you can see that the latter is being cut; 
however, the knife as well is affected by the butter and has 
to ‘resist’ the butter’s characteristics that attempt to make it 
persevere in its being.
Spinoza distinguishes several degrees of knowledge (modes 
of perception) depending on how we, as bodies, get affected 
by other bodies (see my essay Architectures of Joy for more 
on that). Deleuze uses the example of the wave to make him-
self understood in his description of these three degrees. 
Somebody who is said not to be able to swim is someone 
who does not experience the wave in another way than a very 
passive one. The water encounters her/his body as an ob-
stacle to its flow and it results in violence between the two 
bodies (wave/human). The second degree of knowledge 
is expressed by someone who is said to be able to swim. 
(S)he positions her/himself as a body in ‘accordance’ with 
the flow of the wave and therefore composes harmonious 
relations with water. While this second degree is strictly em-
pirical (one has to experience the wave, adjust, experience 
again, adjust again, etc.), the third one is rational in the most 
powerful sense. It consists in an understanding tending (but 
probably never reaching) towards perfection of the totality of 
relations operating in matter. In other words (again, simplify-
ing involves a certain degree of inaccuracy but it allows a 
first level of understanding), this degree of knowledge can 
be seen as a sort of visual (or tactile) layer superimposed on 
one’s vision which would bring such a ‘resolution’ than one 
would be able to perceive the infinitely small parts of matter 
and the various vectors of forces applied to it. This mode of 
perception is therefore only a horizon and cannot really be 
fully acquired but, if we keep using the example of the wave, 
we can probably say that the best surfers are probably close 
to this degree of knowledge of the sea.
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As fallible bodies, we cannot compose harmonious relations 
with every body we encounter. Such truth is, for Spinoza, the 
essence of the Genesis’ mythical mystery. Despite the period 
in which he lived, his philosophy makes it impossible for us 
to think that he was creationist (however, calling him an evo-
lutionist would be even more blatant anachronism; he rarely 
thinks in terms of history). In his famous epistolary exchange 
with Bleyenberg, he nonetheless ‘plays the game’, interpret-
ing the Biblical myth to unfold his conceptual work. Spinoza 
accuses the three biblical religions of having told this story 
through a judgmental approach: God forbids Adam to eat 
the fruit, he eats it, he is punished. Spinoza approaches 
the same narrative through a different optic. God ‘tells’ (of 
course, the personification of God does not correspond to 
anything in Spinoza’s philosophy) Adam that the apple is poi-
sonous (in other words, Adam has the intuition or the instinct 
that the apple is bad for him), he eats it anyway and becomes 
sick. The fruit was poisoned, i.e. it could not compose har-
monious relations with Adam’s body/stomach. The result of 
this encounter is that Adam is sick, or should we say, to use 
Spinozist terminology, he lost a bit of his power (potentia), he 
experiences a sad affect. Each of these encounters between 
bodies, results either in a joyful affect that constructs a sort of 
third body for a moment, composed of the two original ones 
in the state of symbiosis, or a sad affect that decomposes 
the relations of both bodies (not necessarily in a symmetrical 
manner, however).
Spinoza’s letters to Bleyenberg are known as the letters 
about evil. Yet, the notion of evil, and therefore the notion of 
moral is foreign to Spinoza’s philosophy. There is no good/
evil that would be dictated from a transcendental law that 
would assign each event or behavior to one of these two cat-
egories; there can be only good and bad (we can say joyful 
and sad) within the context of each body’s ethics. The latter 
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is not a voluntarily self-constructed set of rules, what we usu-
ally mean when we say ‘ethics’ (let’s recall that there is no 
freedom as such for Spinoza). Rather, there is the experience 
of each affect as potentially and effectively harmonious and 
disharmonious with our own material assemblage, i.e. our 
body, i.e. us.
.....
Originally published on March 27 2013
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EPISODE 5: THE SPINOZIST 
“SCREAM”: WHAT CAN 
A BODY DO?
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 3: DELEUZE]
The “scream” evoked in the title refers to the concept of 
philosophical scream that Deleuze invents to define a phrase 
written or pronounced by a philosopher that contains the es-
sence of his life’s work. The scream has to be understood in 
two senses (at least, that is the way I interpret it): the abso-
lute, almost physical, necessity for a philosopher to “scream” 
this phrase, and the trouble caused within the normative way 
of thinking by the same phrase. In the case of Spinoza, ac-
cording to Deleuze, this scream is expressed in Ethics, part 
3, prop. 2:
However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits 
to the powers of the body, that is, no one has 
as yet been taught by experience what the body 
can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in 
so far as she is regarded as extension. No one 
hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge 
of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain 
all its functions; nor need I call attention to the 
fact that many actions are observed in the lower 
animals, which far transcend human sagacity, 
and that somnambulists do many things in their 
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sleep, which they would not venture to do when 
awake: these instances are enough to show, that 
the body can by the sole laws of its nature do 
many things which the mind wonders at.
Again, no one knows how or by what means the 
mind moves the body, nor how many various de-
grees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how 
quickly it can move it.
According to Deleuze, the approach of the body (and there-
fore of individuals) to what it can do rather than to what it is, 
is the main difference between an ethical philosophy and a 
moralist one. One has to understand that Spinoza does not 
consider an individual as the scheme where a soul would be 
hosted by a body. Each body is an assemblage of substance, 
and chemistry that makes us think should be considered as 
a very similar process to the one that makes us run, dance 
or…walk on a tight rope. Just like we need to forget the idea 
of the soul being hosted within the body vessel, we need to 
stop thinking of the body as a set of organs contained within 
an epidermic enclosure that prevents them from “escaping”. 
We are an assemblage of substance, of matter that the bios 
(life) is holding together for a while. This matter, just like any 
other in the world, is subjected to movements of speed and 
slowness. The way we compose these internal movements 
with the ones that surround us precisely defines our relation 
to the world. A cross-reading of Deleuze’s lectures allows a 
better understanding of this way of thinking: he is a Spinozist 
even when he is not talking about Spinoza! In his seminar 
about Cinema: The Movement Image in 1981, he talks about 
the movement of matter in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. 
(my translation):
What is moving ? Matter is moving. What does 
that mean, to move, then? It means to pass from 
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one form to another. Form does not get to trans-
form, it is matter that goes from one form to an-
other. That is a continuous idea in Plato’s work: 
it is not the small that becomes big, it is not the 
cold that becomes hot. But when water gets hot-
ter, a fluid matter, water, goes from one form to 
another, from the cold form to the hot form; it is 
not the cold that becomes hot.
Forms themselves are immobile or they have 
movements in thoughts, but the finite movement 
consists in a matter that passes from one form 
to another. A horse gallops, you have two forms: 
[…] the horse’s form at the maximum of its mus-
cular contraction and the one at the maximum 
of its muscular development. You will then say 
that gallop is the operation for which the “horse-
matter” (matière cheval), the horse’s body in its 
mobility does not cease to go from form A to form 
B and from form B to form A.
What Spinoza means by expressing our ignorance about 
what a body can do is, of course, not an absolute. We know 
some of the things that a body can do based on the second 
degree of knowledge that we all experience on a daily basis 
(we would not be able to move at all otherwise). We might 
even have a small glimpse at what the third degree of knowl-
edge might be (see the previous chapter for an explanation of 
the degrees of knowledge); however, we can never achieve 
a perfect understanding of the world according to this same 
third degree of knowledge and will therefore never fully know 
what a body can do. Our ability to gain control and decisive-
ness over the movement of the matter assemblage (again, 
that concerns what we simply call “the intellect” just as well) 
that we are, constitutes the only way to acquire a broader 
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knowledge about the capacities of the body and thus, about 
increasing our power (potentia) and therefore our joy.
I have now placed my conceptual tools in front of me. In the 
next chapters, I try to use them to elaborate a sort of “applied 
Spinozism” that might help us, as creators, to express a ma-
terialist and immanent vision of the world.
.....
Originally published on March 30th 2013
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EPISODE 6: APPLIED 
SPINOZISM: THE BODY IN 
KUROSAWA’S CINEMA
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 11: CINEMA]
To be honest, I am not quite sure where I am going with this 
first of two chapters on potential Applied Spinozism; the pos-
sibility of reading the bodies depicted in the cinema of Akira 
Kurosawa through the philosophy of Spinoza is not neces-
sarily obvious (he is usually associated with authors like Dos-
toevsky or Shakespeare) and my interpretation of it might be 
somehow shallow and incomplete. I suppose, however, that 
good ideas are based on intuitions and, for this reason, the 
latter should be explored!
Having watched of Kurosawa films these last four years, I 
noticed that we often see in them one or two characters who 
are struggling to climb up an earth slope. That is the case 
in The Bad Sleep Well (1960), The Hidden Fortress (1958), 
Rashomon (1950), High and Low (1963) and probably in more 
that I forgot or did not watch. The almost obsessive care that 
Kurosawa takes to film those scenes of various length leads 
us to think that there might be something important to be 
observed in them. These scenes do not bring anything to 
the plot in terms of additional information, and an inattentive 
reading of them could let us think that a flat land would pretty 
much depict the same action; but, again, the slope seems 
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to be a crucial element in Kurosawa’s cinematographic (and 
therefore conceptual) toolbox.
It is important to stress the fact that those slopes are not 
symbolic. In the four films I indicated above, the reasons 
that force the characters to climb up them are all different. 
In The Bad Sleep Well, the character climbs up a volcano to 
kill himself while in The Hidden Fortress, the two buffoons/
protagonists experience the difficulty of the slope during their 
trip. In Rashomon, the two main characters are climbing up 
the terrain of the forest so that one can rob the other, while in 
High and Low, the slope is used in the context of a police in-
vestigation. Kurosawa’s choice to insist on this type of scene 
is thus strictly “material” in the sense that there is no mean-
ing that would be expressed in indirect ways through these 
scenes. The difficulty of the bodies climbing up the terrain 
seems to be a perfect illustration of the necessary struggle 
a body has to face to adjust the material assemblage (s)he 
is to the material assemblage that surrounds her (him), as 
we said in the preceding chapter. The stones that occasion-
ally tumble down along the slopes as the body attempts to 
climb them could even be seen as a “wink” from Kurosawa 
to Spinoza’s repeated example of the stone (see chapter 2), 
but again, that might be strictly coincidental.
Such a struggle towards the harmony of the body and the 
surrounding matter can be seen in various other moments 
in the cinema of Kurosawa. The most expressive example of 
it is probably the ultimate moment of the battle in the village 
of Seven Samurai (1954) as the rain, the earth and the blood 
are mixed into an ubiquitous mud with which the bodies have 
no choice but to compose. Again, such conditions were not 
necessary for the film’s plot; quite the contrary, the fights ac-
quire a slowness that is at the antipodes of what spectacular 
cinema requires. Kurosawa’s cinema, however, is different. 
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He does not want to liberate the bodies from the weight of 
things including their own. The beauty comes precisely from 
the way the bodies engage with the matter: some of them 
are cruelly left in the first mode of perception where the sur-
rounding matter remains a site of violent encounter that the 
body has to experience. His heroes, however, are bodies 
which embrace matter and thus achieve the second mode 
of perception. Sometimes they even approach the third one, 
usually in fights, when they seem to read almost perfectly the 
surrounding movement of speed and slowness of the matter 
which, of course, includes their opponent.
I would like to conclude this article with a last example of 
Kurosawa’s Spinozism by invoking a film I already wrote 
about, Throne of Blood (1957), a cinematographic adapta-
tion of Macbeth. (just as in Shakespeare’s text, here the final 
battle involves an army camouflaged by a multitude of trees 
that they cut and transport with them. The graphic effect, and 
therefore the camouflage’s goal, appears as a moving of-
fensive forest that comes to claim its rights against Washizu/
Macbeth’s castle. Leaving the symbolic and animist aspects 
of this story aside, let’s focus on the strict physical charac-
teristics of this fantastic scene: the hybridization of human 
bodies with others, the trees, in a sort of literal interpreta-
tion of becoming-nature as Deleuze could have theorized it 
(he more often evokes becoming-animal). Despite the fact 
that trees are usually the paradigmatic fetish of a Cartesian 
nature, as opposed to the world of artifacts, we have to un-
derstand the notion of nature in a Spinozist way. Nature is the 
material world, it is the substance, it is God and nothing can 
exist outside of it. A concept of becoming nature is therefore 
an acknowledgement of the existence of bodies within this 
nature and the possibility for them to construct harmonious, 
if not entirely hybrid, relations at the material level of their own 
composition. Such a philosophy requires an imaginary that 
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the Deleuzian metaphors and the films of Kurosawa contrib-
ute to construct.
Following illustrations are extracted from The Hidden Fortress 
(1958), The Bad Sleep Well (1960), Seven Samurai (1954) & 
Throne of Blood (1957) by Akira Kurosawa
.....
Originally published on March 31st 2013
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EPISODE 7: APPLIED SPINOZISM: 
ARCHITECTURES OF THE SKY VS. 
ARCHITECTURES OF THE EARTH
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 8: ARAKAWA+GINS]
Similar to Architectures of Joy I wrote in 2010 and to which I of-
ten refer in this pamphlet. However, this time, I would like to op-
pose a Spinozist architecture to its antagonist. It is important to 
observe that attributing the status of ‘Spinozist’ to an architec-
ture is a relatively artificial and subjective designation. All archi-
tectures do, to some varying extent, celebrate the composition 
of material assemblages that will interact with the bodies they 
host. Nevertheless, just as I did for the cinema of Kurosawa in 
the preceding chapter, I want to point out some architectures 
that express the essence of Spinoza’s philosophy with more 
intensity (another Spinozist term) than others. Moreover, these 
others seem to express an essence that can be interpreted as 
an opposition to Spinoza’s philosophy. I designate this antag-
onism as Architecture of the Sky vs. Architecture of the Earth. 
One could argue that the sky is fully part of Spinoza’s philoso-
phy, at the same level as the ground; however, here the sky 
has to be understood through two attributes: a symbolic one 
that understands the sky in a theological way, and a “practical” 
one in the sense that what is called “architectures of the sky” 
would not challenge the body in a direct physical manner. We 
could use two other antagonist notions to define this conflict: 
the transcendental vs. the immanent.
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ARCHITECTURES OF THE SKY ///
Architectures of the sky involve the body in its vision and its 
ability to feel the negative space created by their proportions. 
They are built in such a way that the body is humbled, small 
as it is under the mightiness of the sky materialized by the 
roof. For this reason, it is a theological architecture and its 
paradigmatic example is the Gothic Cathedral in the way 
it expresses the fear and respect of a transcendental God. 
Although it does not necessarily appear as such, the Milan 
Trade Fair Building designed by Massimiliano & Doriana Fuk-
sas, is also a theological architecture. Of course, it is not ded-
icated to “God,” but it celebrates a form of deity embodied by 
the architect.  The image of the “vortex” viewed from above is 
engaged in a direct dialog with the famous photograph of Le 
Corbusier’s finger that became the symbol of the transcen-
dental architect’s action on the world. It is as if the Architect 
(with a capital A) pressed the roof of the Trade Fair with his 
(the Architect is always involved in normative processes of 
masculinity) finger and thus transformed the space below it 
and magnified his intervention. The plan is the architect’s me-
dium but it is also the symptom of his deity. He traces lines 
and laughs to see all these little bodies trapped in the spatial 
apparatuses he drew from above.
ARCHITECTURES OF THE EARTH ///
I apologize for using the same examples when I invoke the 
question of an architecture that truly challenges the body 
but they are so paradigmatic that using other (and probably 
tamer) illustrations would not serve the argument as well. 
Those examples are the Oblique Function elaborated by Paul 
Virilio and Claude Parent in the 1960’s and embodied in vari-
ous buildings, the life work of Arakawa and Madeline Gins to 
create Reversible Destiny architecture for its users, whose 
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objective is to reverse the process of aging and death, or 
the various playgrounds of the world including the fantastic 
one in Belleville designed by BASE. In those three cases the 
architecture is mostly generated from the surface with which 
the body has no choice but to interact, as we continuously 
touch it: the ground. The latter is treated as a terrain (we 
might say, the original status of all grounds) that the body 
needs to “conquer” (to re-use the Deleuzian terminology for 
Spinozist concepts) in order to appropriate it.
What is truly Spinozist about this architecture is the fact that 
one is forced to develop the second degree of knowledge 
(the one that makes your body compose harmonious rela-
tions with your physical environment) that can ultimately flirt 
with the third one (a perfect reading of the material assem-
blages in their movement of speed and slowness). The out-
come of such a conquest is an increase of power (potentia), 
hence the joy to which I was referring in the original text. The 
joy is quite literal in the case of the playgrounds, but in the 
case of the work of Arakawa and Madeline Gins, this increase 
of potentia goes as far as aiming at a significant reduction of 
the aging process (manifested by their poetic We Have De-
cided Not To Die) by strengthening the body and its biology 
through architecture. In a society of idols and comfort that 
serve the exact opposite purpose, we absolutely need more 
architectures of Spinozist joy. 
.....
Originally published on April 1st 2013
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ARCHITECTURES OF JOY: 
A SPINOZIST READING OF 
PARENT + VIRILIO  & ARAKAWA 
+ GINS’ ARCHITECTURE
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 8: ARAKAWA+GINS]
In the middle of the 17th century, Baruch Spinoza revolu-
tionized theology by proposing a tremendous change in the 
definition of God. Departing from the classic transcendental 
vision of a God creator, he introduced an immanent vision 
of God creature. Some architects might stop their reading 
of Spinoza’s Ethics here and consider the whole theory as 
foreign to their practice. However, this immanent theology en-
visions the world in such a way that it can inspire creation of 
architecture, what we will call, an architecture of joy. The first 
part of this short essay will attempt to concisely envision Spi-
noza’s Ethics, the second will present the difference between 
joyful affects and sad affects, and the third and last will try to 
construct relationships between this philosophy and the ar-
chitectural projects designed by Claude Parent and Paul Vir-
ilio in the 1960’s on the one hand, and those built by Arakawa 
and Madeline Gins in the last ten years on the other hand.
Spinoza envisions God as the infinite substance composing 
the universe. This substance is an infinite amount of infinitely 
small parts which develop external relations with each other 
and thus compose bodies. The ability of those bodies to 
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maintain the effort of persisting in their own being is called 
conatus and composes the essence of things. These bodies 
have the ability to encounter and affect each other and thus 
increase or decrease their power of action. Given the above, 
we can observe that Spinoza is not only a rebel against reli-
gion but also against the paradigmatic philosophy of his cen-
tury , i.e. the Cartesian philosophy. In fact, in the second book 
of his Ethics, Spinoza demonstrates the following proposi-
tion: the human mind does not perceive any external body 
as existing, except through the ideas of modification of its 
own body. In other words, a mind knows itself only via the 
encounter with other things, which is in complete contradic-
tion to Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” in which a mind 
knows itself by thinking. Spinoza, on the contrary, could have 
statedsomething like: “I encounter, therefore I am.”
Spinoza distinguishes four modes of perception in his Trea-
tise on the Improvement of the Understanding . In order to fo-
cus on the proposed topic, we won’t even evoke the first one, 
“arising from hearsay”. In fact, in his lecture at the University 
of Vincennes about Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze – who appears 
between the lines in this essay- does not even talk about this 
first mode of perception that he calls kinds of knowledge. 
These three remaining modes of perception are the follow-
ing:
- The first one is empirical. It implies only the experience 
of shock between the extensive parts of respective bodies 
and thus provides what Spinoza calls inadequate ideas. In 
order to illustrate this mode, Deleuze uses the example of 
the wave. In the first mode of perception/knowledge, one can 
only experience the shock of the wave against one’s body. 
In other words, it provokes a knowledge of effects without a 
knowledge of causes.
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- The second one is both empirical and rational. It involves 
the composition of relations between the bodies. In the il-
lustration of the wave, one can position one’s body in such a 
way that the relations of the wave compose in a harmonious 
way with the relation of one’s body.
- The third one is strictly rational. It implies a perception of the 
essence of a thing or, following what we wrote earlier about 
the essence, the understanding of the mechanisms of per-
petuation of a body in its being. It is an understanding of 
causes and thus it can be defined as adequate ideas.
The purpose of this essay probably becomes clearer and one 
can distinguish the role that the second mode of perception 
can play in architecture. However, it is still too early to evoke 
this question as the Ethics itself has not been yet deployed.
We have established Spinoza’s theology/cosmology and dif-
ferent modes of perception of it; nevertheless, the second 
part needs to examine what makes Spinoza calls his book 
Ethics. In fact, one of the reasons for his Cherem (excom-
munication in Judaism) from the Jewish Community is that 
Spinoza establishes a fundamental distinction between re-
ligious morality and individual ethics. Good versus evil, both 
determined transcendentally, are replaced by good versus 
the bad, determined by whether there is accordance or dis-
cordance of relations between parts composing bodies.
As Deleuze explains in his class, when I have an encounter 
such that the relation of the body which modifies me, which 
acts on me, is combined with my own relation, my power of 
acting is increased. This encounter that increases the power 
of acting is defined by Spinoza as good; he calls it Joy. As 
a corollary, any encounter that tends to destroy the relations 
of one’s body is considered bad for this body and is called 
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Sadness. Just as Spinoza decided to keep religious termi-
nology (God) in order to show the revolutionary content of 
his philosophy, he uses creationist religious example of the 
Original Sin in his demonstration in order to deactivate what 
used to be the paradigm of a religious morality. He affirms 
that Adam did not do an evil act when he ate the apple, but 
rather he did a bad act as the relations of the apple were not 
composing well with his own relations. What is described in 
the Bible as a divine interdiction to eat the apple is nothing 
else than Adam’s instinct that the apple may be poisonous 
for his body.
Since joy results from harmony of relations between two bod-
ies, joy can be said to be the motor of the persistence of the 
parts in their being. We have already seen that this persis-
tence is called essence by Spinoza, but it also matches his 
notion of desire, also called appetite. This notion is central 
to my discussion, as it implies what action is required for the 
concerned architecture to be activated and to be legitimately 
considered an Architecture of Joy.
Having stated these principles of Spinoza’s Ethics, we can 
now begin to evoke the two architectures we proposed to 
investigate in this essay.
The first one is the work of the association between two 
French architects, Claude Parent and Paul Virilio between 
1963 and 1969 under the name of Architecture Principe. In 
1964, they established an architectural manifesto that can be 
summarized by an action of tilting the ground that replaces 
the paradigmatic assemblage of horizontal plans with vertical 
ones. They call it the Oblique Function.
If we apply a Spinozist reading to the Oblique Function, we 
can observe that the first mode of perception is necessarily 
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occurring as gravity forces the bodies’ parts to interact with 
the architectural surface’s parts. However, as opposed to ar-
chitectures which proceed only with flat floors, in the Oblique 
Function, gravity imposes an additional effect on the bodies: 
a directionality. In fact, any movement of the body in any di-
rection will exercise on it a degree of acceleration. This ac-
celeration will be negative if the body attempts to climb up 
the surface and it will be positive if the same body attempts 
to go down the slope.
If for the sake of the argument we accept to consider the 
effects of a flat surface on the body as negligible, we ob-
Diagram for the Oblique Function by Claude Parent (1964)
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viously cannot do the same for the Oblique Function’s ef-
fects. In fact, a negative acceleration imposed on the body 
creates a fatigue on the body whereas a positive one triggers 
an exhilaration. One could thus hastily argue that only half 
of the potential movements on this surface provides a Spi-
nozist joy while the other half provokes sadness. However, 
this affirmation would be inaccurate, since the body in action, 
while conquering slope is expressing its power of existence. 
Here,  we use the word conquest in the same way as Deleuze 
when he talks about the conquest of colors by Gauguin and 
Van Gogh. This leads us to think that comfort and joy are not 
synonyms. We might even wonder if they are not antonyms.
In that sense, the experience of the Oblique Function, re-
quires the exercise of the second mode of perception. On 
this tilted surface, a body can only persist in its being if it 
manages to compose harmoniously its relations with the re-
lations of the surface. That is how we can affirm that Claude 
Parent and Paul Virilio manage to create an Architecture of 
Joy in the Spinozist sense of joy. The Oblique Function is only 
a manifesto, but it is interesting to observe the work -- mostly 
by Parent -- that has been built based on those principles:
- The Villa Drusch in Versailles (1963)
- Sainte Bernadette Church in Nevers (1966)
- The French Pavilion at the Venice Biennale (1970)
- Claude Parent’s apartment in Neuilly sur Seine (1973)
The second architecture to which we apply a Spinozist read-
ing is the work of Arakawa and Madeline Gins. In fact, despite 
the fact that their work, similar to many other radical archi-
tects, has been categorized by critics as having more to do 
with art than with architecture, their production is probably 
the best achievement of a Spinozist architecture.
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In order to illustrate this point, we have to start by evoking the 
notion of the Architectural Body developed by Arakawa and 
Gins. In fact, in their research on the interaction between the 
human body and the architectural environment, they estab-
lish this notion as a symbiosis of those two entities. The Archi-
tectural Body is thus an entity in which the second mode of 
perception is continuous. Placed in a state of disequilibrium 
as in Arakawa and Gins’ architecture, the human body keeps 
re-harmonizing its parts in relation with the architectural parts 
and thus develops a conscience of its direct environment. Via 
this process of harmonization, the body learns and becomes 
both stronger and more skillful.
That leads us to the main purpose of such an architecture for 
Arakawa and Madeline Gins which consists in an adamant 
refusal of death. In accordance with the 18th century French 
physiologist Xavier Bichat who stated that life is the totality of 
functions that resist death , they undertake to architecturally 
train the body against the continuous degradation of human 
tissues.
One could not be more wrong to associate this enterprise 
with the Modernist belief for potential healing characteristics 
of architecture. Indeed, what Arakawa and Gins call Revers-
ible Destiny is an absolute refusal of modernist comfort that 
triggers a process of weakening of the body and decreases 
its power. On the contrary, their architecture challenges the 
body, puts it in danger and leaves it without any other alterna-
tive than to react to this delicate situation. In this regard, this 
architecture is profoundly anti-paternalist and clearly pos-
sesses some emancipative characteristics. It releases the 
same Spinozist freedom as when he writes that “a thing is 
called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, 
and is determined to act by itself alone”.
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Spinoza describes death as the change of belonging of a 
body’s parts to another body. The parts do not persist in 
their being anymore and they start to populate one or several 
other bodies. The goal of Arakawa and Gins is therefore to 
maintain this persistence as long as possible via a continu-
ous conquest of joy, as we have been defining it earlier in this 
essay. Describing the conditions offered by the Bioscleave 
House (Life Span Extending Villa), Madeline Gins offers this 
evocative sentence: “Every day, you are practicing how not 
to die.”
In the Ethics, Spinoza writes that no one has hitherto laid 
down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, “no one 
has as yet been taught by experience what the body can ac-
complish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is re-
garded as extension.” Thus, he asks a fundamental question 
that can be formulated this way: What can a body do? The 
question that the Oblique Function and the Reversible Des-
tiny ask is not different in any way. Acknowledging their com-
mon ignorance with Spinoza, those radical architects attempt 
to create an environment dedicated to the Spinozist Joy, only 
condition for the beginning of an answer to this question. 
Previous and following illustrations are photographs by the 
author at the Reversible Destiny Foundation’s Bioscleave 
House (Oct 2011).
.....
Originally published on December 18th 2010
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ARCHITECTURE OF THE 
CONATUS: “TENTATIVE 
CONSTRUCTING TOWARDS
A HOLDING IN PLACE”
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 8: ARAKAWA+GINS]
“If persons are sited, why do philosophers inquir-
ing into what constitutes a person, or, for that mat-
ter, into the nature of mind, rarely, if ever, factor 
this in?”
“Philosophers considering persons as sites would 
be obliged to develop a person architectonics. 
They would, I am afraid, have to turn themselves 
into architects of sorts.”
This chapter focuses on the work of the Reversible Destiny 
Foundation (Arakawa + Madeline Gins) in order to deepen 
the understanding of their theoretical and design work (which 
are not really discernible one from another).
The title that I chose, Architecture of the Conatus, refers to their 
book Architectural Body (University of Alabama Press, 2002) 
and thus allows me to associate it, once again with Spinozist 
philosophy.For Spinoza, each assemblage of substance i.e. 
body, “as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its be-
ing” (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). In other words, each thing will be 
continuously involved in a process of effort to keep the integ-
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rity of the material assemblage that constitutes it. Any animal 
(humans included), for example, will keep its body together 
as long as the latter is involved in the vital process. When this 
animal dies, however, its body will decompose and its matter 
will be reassembled in other bodies (soil, etc.). Arakawa and 
Madeline Gins present a similar concept in their book.
Arakawa and Gins calls Architectural Body a composition 
of a living material assemblage constituted both by the hu-
man body itself and its direct environment. Just as for any 
body, such an assemblage integrates the movement of the 
matter within it (think of human body’s biology). The Architec-
tural Body also involves the biological and other microscopic 
movements of its elements’ matter; but to this microscopic 
scale, the Architectural Body adds a macroscopic one in 
which the human body continuously composes material rela-
tions with its environment. Note how Arakawa and Gins use 
the noun person as a verb in the following passage:
Close observations have yet to be made of the ef-
fect of type of habitation on persons. Those who 
would minutely observe the effect of habitation on 
human beings must begin to discern how and 
why surroundings give or withhold from organ-
isms of the type that can person the means to be-
have as persons. Even as the concept of person 
can stay put (everyone knows what a person is), 
it needs to be greatly dilated (particularly within 
a book entitled Architectural Body). We have ad-
opted the admittedly clumsy term “organism that 
persons” because it portrays persons as being in-
termittent and transitory outcomes of coordinated 
forming rather than honest-togoodness entities; 
now that we have launched the term, we use the 
following less cumbersome terms synonymously 
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with it: body, body-proper, human being, organ-
ism, organism-person, person. When studying 
what goes on between the bodyproper and its 
surroundings, it will be necessary to consider the 
extent to which persons are behavioral subsets of 
the organisms from which they emanate and out 
of which they compose themselves as agents of 
action. 
A taking shape of surrounds and bodies and or-
ganisms and persons occurs intermixedly. Logic 
would want to get in there with a knife and cut 
them apart. Although we are utterly dependent 
on the force of logic prior to constructing the 
surrounds that will test our hypotheses, we will 
say no to logic and resist making incisions and 
separating the probably inseparable. All the link-
ing and enclosing, an it (think of this as an auto-
poietic system if you like) that starts as enclosed 
and then goes about enclosing itself—all of that 
needs to be picked up as an organism-like whole, 
kicking and screaming, alive with process, em-
phatically, and urgently rushed into a supporting 
context of embedded procedures. 
Going back to the notion of conatus, Arakawa and Gins intro-
duce their concept of bioscleave, that can be interpreted as 
the Spinozist notion of substance, as the universal (theologi-
cal for Spinoza) ensemble of matter and its internal energy. 
Rather than the Spinozist necessary perfection of the sub-
stance, Madeline Gins and Arakawa talk about the balance 
of the bioscleave without which, no vitality can be developed:
Bioscleave—people breathe it, it sustains them—
has parts and elements, many of which exhibit an 
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order, even as it presents itself as an enormously 
confused mass with operative factors that cannot 
be distinguished. Who moves through this mass 
of chaos, this massive mix of order and chaos, 
has sited awareness buried there within it. 
Start by thinking of architecture as a tentative 
constructing toward a holding in place. Architec-
ture’s holding in place occurs within and as part 
of a prevailing atmospheric condition that others 
routinely call biosphere but which we, feeling the 
need to stress its dynamic nature, have renamed 
bioscleave.
All species belonging to bioscleave exist only 
tentatively (which remains true whatever turns out 
to be the truth about natural selection, whether 
it happens randomly or with directionality), with 
some species, all things being unequal, existing 
on a far more tentative basis than others. Addition-
ally, bioscleave stays breathable and in the picture 
only so long as elements take hold of each other 
in particular ways, only so long as there can be a 
cleaving of a this to a that and a cleaving of a this 
off of a that. So that there might be new and dif-
ferent link-ups, fresh points of departure, ever re-
newed tentative constructing toward a holding in 
place, a firm and definite taking hold, which gives 
one sense of the term to cleave, must also read-
ily entail cutting apart, cut-off, relinquishment, the 
other sense of the term. Should a crucial element 
fail to hold its own, bioscleave would go missing, 
collapsing into untempered atmosphere, leaving 
(but no one would be there to tell) an uninhabit-
able planet in its wake. A single missing element 
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Ubiquitous Site – Nagi Ryoanji by Reversible Destiny Foundation (1994)
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Photograph extracted from the book We Have Decided Not To Die (1997)
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(carbon or oxygen) or an aberrant formation of a 
molecule, to say nothing of a large-scale cata-
clysmic event, could make bioscleave vanish, 
bringing an abrupt end to millennia of tentative 
constructing toward a holding in place. 
The last excerpt introduces the particular notion of tentative 
constructing toward a holding in place (very close to the Spi-
nozist definition of the conatus) or, in the excellent French 
translation by by Monique Chassagnol, construction tâton-
nante en vue d’un maintien en place. The word “tâtonnante“ 
used by Chassagnol conveys, in my opinion, an even more 
expressive meaning of the Architectural Body than the Eng-
lish word tentative used by the authors. Tatonner in French 
incorporates the notion of tentative but adds to it the idea of 
groping, a highly corporal idea. One might remember Mad-
eline Gins’  book Helen Keller or Arakawa (Santa Fe: Burning 
Books, 1994) including the famous deafblind author in their 
discourse. This makes a lot of sense as the Architectural Body 
involves only limited visual and auditive characteristics com-
pared to its hyper-tactility. 
One of my first experiences when I visited the Bioscleave 
House in October 2011 was to use a blind cane and go 
around the house’s central terrain with closed eyes. It helps 
understanding how one could acquire more and more ease 
experiencing the terrain “only” (but there is no “only” here) 
with one’s feet. By doing so, one composes a more balanced 
architectural body:
Staying current with bioscleave, remaining alive 
as part of it, involves keeping pace with the ten-
tativeness it brings to bear, staying focused on 
the elusiveness as such of this tenuous event-
fabric or event-matrix. Everything is tentative, but 
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some things or events have a tentativeness with 
a faster-running clock than others. So that there 
can at least be a keeping pace with bioscleave’s 
tentativeness, it becomes necessary to divine 
how best to join events into an event-fabric, which 
surely involves learning to vary the speed at which 
one fabricates tentative constructings toward 
holding in place.
Architecture occurs as one of many ways life sees 
fit to conduct and construct itself, a form of life, 
and all forms of life have, without doubt, as of this 
date, but a limited and uncertain existence. Even 
so, thus far only nomads have held architecture to 
be as a matter of course tentative.
Life—Bios—would seem to be constituted by 
interactions between tentative constructings to-
ward a holding in place, with the body, the body-
in-action, surely the main fiddler at the fair. Bodily 
movements that take place within and happen 
in relation to works of architecture, architectural 
surrounds, are to some extent formative of them. 
Those living within and reading and making what 
they can of an architectural surround are instru-
mental in and crucial to its tentative construct-
ing toward a holding in place. We do not mean 
to suggest that architecture exists only for the 
one who beholds or inhabits it, but rather that 
the body-in-action and the architectural surround 
should not be defined apart from each other, or 
apart from bioscleave. 
I would like to introduce an excerpt where Gins and Arakawa 
are directly addressing the reader asking her/him to complete 
a small assignment that can work in any space where (s)he 
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reads the book. They go as far as making the reader actively 
enter the narrative, since (s)he speaks in the text. The assign-
ment consists in rotating the room where the reader currently 
is by ten degrees to increase her/his awareness of the physi-
cal space surrounding her/him. The extreme manifestation of 
such an imaginative space can be found in the Ubiquitous 
Site – Nagi Ryoanji, built in 1994 in Japan, which concretizes 
the same assignment, except that it is no more 10 degrees of 
inclination but the infinity of degrees betwee 0 and 360, since 
the floor is cylindrical.
Contribute your room, your architectural surround 
of the moment, to this text. For your room to be 
of use in what follows, it needs to be transformed 
into a work of procedural architecture. Note where 
in the room you are and the direction in which you 
are facing. To have this room—the room in which 
you happen to be reading this—stand out dis-
tinctly as the room it is, select and keep vivid a 
representative group of its features. Now take the 
room and give its floor a ten-degree tilt along its 
longest length (if the room is square, either side is 
fine). Make a double of your room thus tilted and 
place it next to the original. Seesaw the floor of 
the double so that it ends up tilting in the opposite 
direction.
ARCHITECT: We have now been in both rooms. It 
is apparent that the two together frame the impact 
on us of an architectural surround, that is, of the 
room in which you are reading this text.
READER: I lean differently into the situation of ex-
actly this room within each of its exemplars.
ARCHITECT: Perfect. 
.....
Originally published on April 10th 2013
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THE BODY AS A MATERIAL 
ASSEMBLAGE IN JAPANESE 
MARTIAL ARTS & DANCE AS 
SEEN BY BASILE DOGANIS
Basile Doganis is a French philosopher particularly interested 
in the field of Japanese culture (see his work about the silence 
in Ozu’s cinema, for example). His book, Pensées du corps: 
La philosophie à l’epreuve des arts gestuels japonais (danse, 
théâtre, arts martiaux) (Body thinking: Philosophy confronted 
to Japanese Gestural Arts (dance, theater, martial arts)) (Paris: 
Les Belles lettres, 2012) is an analysis of the way the body 
is considered in those arts and how it can be approached 
through concepts created in Western Philosophy (Deleuze, 
Bergson, Whitehead, etc.). The book is prefaced by Alain Ba-
diou, who used to be B.Doganis’ professor. In his research, 
jujidsu, kendo, butoh, no have all in common that they deper-
sonnalize the body in order to make it a “puppet” subjected 
to the forces of its environment. Doganis returns this idea 
throughout the book in order to provide a clear visualization 
of this paradoxal status. One would think that the puppet is 
precisely what one would want to avoid to be in the situation 
of dance or fighting. (all translations are mine):
We therefore come up with a paradoxical situation 
that we could formulate as follows : if the body, in 
its most primary manifestation and its mere exis-
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tence, presents more intensity and depth than a 
conscious artistic intention, then we would have 
to seek the minimal degree of intention of a partic-
ularity, of a personal will. However, since a part of 
consciousness and will always remains in action, 
the regulatory ideal will consist in “being dead” 
while being alive or, at least, in giving to the body 
some properties based on pure inertia. For Hiji-
kata in butoh, as we saw, the will to dance always 
includes surprising desire of dispossession and 
handicap. Handicap is like a limit where the body 
is silent and refuses any principle of will and con-
trol. The dancer chooses to progressively give up 
all his ordinary capacities so as to become only 
an instrument, a tool, a mere support through 
which an uncontrollable intensity acts. (Doganis, 
Pensées du corps, 62)
In his extensive description of techniques allowing to reach 
this state of receptivity, Doganis includes a reading of the 
gravity center of one’s body and its micro-variations through 
the movement at every scale of its components. Just like John 
Cage (whose silence is repeatedly compared to Ozu’s in the 
book) insisted and expressed the fact that “silence does not 
exist,” Doganis affirms that “immobility does not exist either.” 
If we “delete” the body action (among other ways, 
through total immobility or by laying down), the 
center constitutes itself through the simple game 
of material and geometrical proportions of the 
body, of the individual’s muscular tensions that 
are variable depending on their initial muscular 
structure, and mostly on the use of those muscles 
and their powered habits. If we add to all those 
parameters the fact that respiration and other 
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“vegetative” activities of the organism like the 
blood circulation are making complete immobility 
of the body impossible, we understand, after the 
observation that silence does not exist, that im-
mobility understood in a strict sense does not ex-
ist either and that, consequently, some perpetual 
micro-variations are affecting the body’s gravity 
center. (Doganis, Pensées du corps, 54).
What is true for a human body is also true for architecture, 
which should not be considered in any way immobile. All 
through the “life” of a building, the latter will be subjected to a 
quasi-infinity of micro-movements of its material components. 
This is fundamental to explain Doganis’ argument in this 
book, which considers the body and its direct environment as 
a material assemblage that one has to learn to read, interpret 
and act upon, in order to master Japanese gestural arts:
Oftentimes, in their pragmatic use of relation-
ships of centrality, in inclusion and participation, 
Japanese gestual arts consider the individual as 
merely a part of a whole that extends beyond him 
infinitely. Thus, we observea development of a val-
ue system where great value is assigned to every-
thing in which a body participates, rather than the 
part it constitutes in and of itself. The entirety of 
an individual’s talent will consist in finding in him 
or herself all the faculties that relates to this whole 
and not to be satisfied with being only a part, a 
partial element. In martial arts, all the relationships 
of strength can be thought on a same spectrum 
and not as the simple superiority of a part over 
the opponent one: the winner will therefore be 
the one that would have identified himself with 
the whole of the fighting situation including oppo-
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nents and environment, and who would have be-
come the ensemble itself and would have make 
his opponent’s status become only a simple part 
of this whole. (Doganis, Pensées du corps, 59).
This materialist reading is crucial to understand the body as 
a biological and anatomical “machine” that cannot be inter-
preted as the receptacle of the soul’s orders, but rather as a 
whole whose limits are not as clearly established as we usual-
ly define them (through the notion of skin for example). In fact, 
the body not only interacts materially with its environment, but 
also composes assemblages with the “molecular” composi-
tion of its surrounding. That is the case with the architecture 
including the body, with the opponent or the partner in the 
case of Japanese gestural arts and also with the notion of tool 
or weapon, as Doganis explains:
The fake limits of the body, animation and con-
tamination
Often one starts in martial arts by training bear 
hands techniques (jujutsu, aikido or karate), and 
then continuing through weapon techniques (ken-
do, aia, kenjutsu), so that those disciplines could 
inform one another with their own specificity. This 
is also more fundamentally because, the weapon 
becomes just as the worker’s tool and the blind 
man’s cane, an extension of the body, a legitimate 
organ. A surprising experience is the relatively fast 
development of the ability to exercise the sense of 
touch with a sword’s extremity, to feel through this 
extremity. As Alain Berthoz says:
“The tool extends the body. We feel the object not 
from the edge of the tool, but rather from the edge 
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of an ensemble constituted by the hand and the 
tool as if, suddenly, the tool became a part of our 
body, just like the hand had been extended. The 
person who irons clothes has the same sensation 
with the iron, the surgeon with his (her) lancet. 
The ring we wear around our finger tends to be 
integrated with the finger itself. Up on stilts, we 
feel the ground from the extremity of those pros-
thetics.”
It seems that, indeed, that the body does not stop 
with the surface of the skin: it can include appro-
priate exterior elements and project itself in them, 
or feel through them and interact with the world. 
(Doganis, Pensées du corps, 81).
We can therefore form, deform, inform or reform the mate-
rial assemblages that our bodies (i.e. we) are. Through that 
thinking, we allow ourselves to stop distinguishing our “body” 
from the various other material assemblies that surrounds us 
(whether the latter are prosthetic, clothes or even architec-
ture). By doing so, we can also get rid of the old notions of 
nature and artifice only to keep the former as the ensemble of 
materials and forces that compose the world:
Genius consists precisely in finding (again) the 
“abstract line” for which the various natural or 
mechanical elements, “human-tool-animal-thing” 
are going to put themselves in a configuration, an 
assemblage in which their relationships between 
each other will be completely disconnected from 
their previous associations and assemblages. In 
the mass of things and beings and their multiple 
relationships is being drawn the original figure of 
an assemblage that, in some sense, does not 
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leave the “nature” and all the artifacts that the lat-
ter allows but rather includes (imprime) within it 
some capacities that were unreachable before 
the machine. In that sense, the “machine”, in its 
traditional sense of strictly mechanical object is 
only a specific case of the abstract machine, or 
“abstract-line” that orders all the other apparatus-
es. Just like the cavalryman, the warrior (and more 
generally any human carrying a weapon or a tool) 
is a machine, with its assemblage human-sword 
which radically differs from a “unit” whose value 
would be strictly subordinated to its pure physi-
cal strength. The abstract line of the machinistic 
assemblage “animates” this whole and gives it an 
“organic” cohesion even if the organic would be 
only a part of this machine. Weapon and anima-
tion are therefore as involved in the “inert” as they 
are in the “organic”. That is what explains the pro-
digious “life” that animates the Japanese dolls of 
bunraku or Kleist’s puppets. We saw how the bu-
toh was using hybrids apparatuses of beliefs, in 
the case of Amagatsu Ushio, for example, to invite 
the dancer to think of himself as an offshoot of the 
ensemble of humanity and evolution, transform-
ing him to a simple cog of an extremely complex 
and dense abstract machine. Through different 
means, Pierre Levy, in his analyses of the great 
movement of virtualization that characterizes the 
modern world and that affects the body of every 
human, comes up with very similar conclusions
“Transplants organize a large circulation of or-
gans in the human body. It depends on the in-
dividuals but also between living and dead. For 
humans, but also for other species, we transplant 
baboon’s hearts, pig’s livers, we make them in-
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gest hormones that were produced by bacteria. 
Transplants and prosthetics blur the boundary 
between mineral and living: glasses, lenses, fake 
teeth, silicone, pacemakers, acoustic prosthetics 
[...] A deterritorialized blood flows from body to 
body through an enormous international network 
whose economical, technological and medical 
components we cannot distinguish anymore. [...] 
The collective body comes back to modify the 
private flesh. Sometimes, it brings it back to life 
or fertilizes it. For a long time, the constitution of 
a collective body and individuals’ participation in 
this physical community used purely symbolic or 
religious mediation. “this is my flesh, this is my 
blood.” It now borrows technical means. [...] 
Each individual body becomes an active part 
of a gigantic hybrid and globalized hyperbody.” 
(Doganis, Pensées du corps, 103).
The mechanisms described by Doganis allow me to finish 
with another Spinozist interpretation of the world, one in which 
each “event” is the “logical” result of the sum of every other 
in the past. It is often claimed that such a determinist read-
ing deprives humans of their very freedom, to which we can 
answer by trying to determine another definition of freedom 
than the one commonly used (and sometimes even used to 
legitimate wars!). This definition would try to articulate a vision 
in which freedom is the informed expression of the forces that 
animates us. Basile Doganis’ treatise is useful to help us think 
that way.
Following illustration is a photograph of Gyohei Zaitsu per-
forming Butoh by Duc (i.e. pixiduc) Paris, France (2008).
.....
Originally published on February 8th 2013
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[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 3: DELEUZE]
The following short excerpt comes from one of Gilles De-
leuze’s lectures about Spinoza in Vincennes (the Parisian 
autonomous University during the 1970’s). This constitutes a 
good illustration of the various modes of knowledge evoked 
in the previous chapters.
DELEUZE ON THE SPINOZIST WAVE ///
Gilles Deleuze. Sur Spinoza. 17.03.1981. Cours Vincennes.
Nobody can deny that to be able to swim is a conquest of 
existence, it is fundamental you understand: I conquer an 
element; it is not so obvious to conquer an element. I can 
swim, I can fly. Wonderful. What does that mean? It is very 
simple: not to be able to swim consists in being vulnerable 
to the confrontation with the wave. Then, you have the infinite 
set of water molecules that compose the wave; it composes 
a wave and I say: it is a wave because its most basic bodies 
that I call “molecules”, actually they are not the most sim-
ple, one should go even further that water molecules. Water 
molecules already belong to a body, the aquatic body, the 
ocean body, etc. What is the first type of knowledge? It is: 
come on, I dare, I go, I am in the first type of knowledge: I 
dare, I wade in, so to speak. What does that mean to wade? 
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To wade, that is very simple. To wade, the word indicates it 
pretty well, one clearly sees that it is some extrinsic relation-
ship: sometimes the wave slaps me and sometimes it takes 
me away; thre are some shock effects. They are shock ef-
fects, meaning, I don’t know anything of the relationships 
that compose themselves or decompose themselves, I re-
ceive the extrinsic parts’ effects. The parts that belong to me 
are being shaken, they gister a shock effect coming from 
parts that belong to the wave. Therefore sometimes I laugh, 
sometimes I weep, depending on whether the wave makes 
me laugh or knocks me out, I am within the passion affects: 
ouch Mummy, the wave beat me up! Ok “Ouch Mummy the 
wave beat me up,” cry that we shall not cease to sound until 
we don’t come out of the first type of knowledge since we 
shall not cease to say: ouch the table hurt me; it is the same 
to say: the other person hurt me; not at all, since the table 
is inanimate, Spinoza is so much smarter than everything 
that one could have said afterwards, not at all because the 
table is inanimate the one should say: the table hurt me, it 
is as stupid as saying: Peter hurt me as to say: The stone 
hurt me or the wave hurt me. It is the same level , it is the 
first type. On the contrary, I can swim; it does not necessar-
ily means that I have a mathematics, physics, or scientific 
knowledge of the wave’s movement, it means that I have a 
skill, a surprising skill, I have a sort of rhythm sense. What 
does that mean, the rhythm, it means that my characteristic 
relationships, I know how to compose them directly with the 
wave’s relationships, it does not happen anymore between 
the wave and myself, meaning it does not happen anymore 
between the extensive parts, the wave’s wet parts and my 
body’s parts; it happens between the relationships. Rela-
tionships that compose the wave, relationships that com-
pose my body, and my skill when I can swim, to present my 
body under some relationships that compose themselves 
directly with the wave’s relationships. I dive at the right time, 
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I come out from under the water at the right time. I avoid the 
coming wave, or on the contrary I use it, etc… All this art of 
the relationships’ composition...
.....
Originally published on December 17th 2010
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“A SUNFLOWER SEED LOST
IN A WALL IS CAPABLE OF 
SHATTERING THAT WALL”
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 3: DELEUZE]
The very useful tumblr Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines 
recently chose an excerpt of Deleuze’s lecture on Spinoza at 
University of Vincennes in 1981. This short text questions the 
notion of body and outline as interpreted by the Stoics that 
can be considered as a base for Spinoza’s question: what 
can a body do? The sentence that both illustrates this ques-
tion and characterizes Deleuze’s powerful and poetic style 
is: “A sunflower seed lost in a wall is capable of shattering 
that wall.”  One can wonder here, if the millions of sunflower, 
Ai Wei Wei brought to the Tate Modern would be able to shat-
ter the Great Wall of China. It looks like it this not the case so 
far, but it is still too early to say…
The other example Deleuze gives to distinguish between 
body and power (puissance) is the forest. Of course the tree 
itself is a body but the forest is a power, power to make the 
trees continue, up to the moment at which it can no longer 
do so.
DELEUZE ABOUT THE SUNFLOWER ///
Sur Spinoza. 17.02.1981. Cours Vincennes
Does everything have an outline? Bateson, who is a genius, 
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has written a short text is called “[why] does everything have 
an outline?” Take the expression “outside the subject,” that 
is to say “beyond the subject.” Does that mean that the sub-
ject has an outline? Perhaps. Otherwise what does “outside 
the limits” mean? At first sight it has a spatial air. But is it 
the same space? Do “outside the limits” and “outside the 
outline” belong to the same space? Does the conversation 
or my course today have an outline? My answer is yes. One 
can touch it. Let’s return to the stoics. Their favorite example 
is: how far does the action of a seed go? A sunflower seed 
lost in a wall is capable of shattering that wall. A thing with 
such a small an outline. How does the sunflower seed go, 
does that mean how far does its surface go? No, the sur-
face is where the seed ends. In their theory of the utterance 
(énoncé), they will say that it states exactly what the seed is 
not. That is to say where the seed is no longer, but that tells 
us nothing about what the seed is. They will say of Plato that, 
with his theory of ideas, he tells us very well what things are 
not, but he tells us nothing about what things are. The Stoics 
cry out triumphantly: things are bodies.
Bodies and not ideas. Things are bodies, that means that 
things are actions. The limit of something is the limit of its 
action and not the outline of its figure. An even simpler ex-
ample: you are walking in a dense forest, you’re afraid. At 
last you succeed and little by little the forest thins out, you 
are pleased. You reach a spot and you say, “whew, here’s the 
edge.” The edge of the forest is a limit. Does this mean that 
the forest is defined by its outline? It’s a limit of what? Is it a 
limit to the form of the forest? It’s a limit to the action of the 
forest, that is to say that the forest that had so much power 
arrives at the limit of its power, it can no longer lie over the 
terrain, it thins out.
The thing that shows that this is not an outline is the fact that 
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we can’t even specify the precise moment at which there is 
no more forest. There was a tendency, and this time the limit 
is not separable, a kind of tension towards the limit. It’s a 
dynamic limit that is opposed to an outline limit. The thing 
has no other limit than the limit of its power [puissance] or its 
action. The thing is thus power and not form. The forest is not 
defined by a form, it is defined by a power: power to make the 
trees continue up to the moment at which it can no longer do 
so. The only question that I have to ask of the forest is: what 
is your power? That is to say, how far will you go?
That is what the Stoics discover and what enables them to 
say: everything is a body. When they say that everything is 
a body, they don’t mean that everything is a sensible thing, 
because they do not emerge from the Platonic point of view. 
If they were to define the sensible thing by form and outline, 
that would hold no interest. When they say that everything is 
a body, for example a circle does not extend in space in the 
same fashion if it is made of wood as it does if it is made of 
marble. Further, “everything is a body” will signify that a red 
circle and a blue circle do not extend in space in the same 
fashion. Thus , there is a tension.
When they say that all things are bodies, they mean that all 
things are defined by tonos, the contracted effort that defines 
the thing. The kind of contraction, the embryonic force that is 
in the thing, if you don’t find it, you don’t know [connaissez] 
the thing. That is what Spinoza takes up again in the formula-
tion “what can a body do?”
.....
Originally published on July 15th 2011
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DESCARTES VS. SPINOZA: A 
PERSONAL READING OF 
TARP NOT NATURE
The third issue of the journal of Pratt Graduate School of Ar-
chitecture, TARP, brings together well-known thinkers and de-
signers (Catherine Ingraham, Ed Keller, David Gissen, Sand-
ford Kwinter, Alisa Andrasek, Patrik Schumacher, Antoine 
Picon and more) and is slyly entitled Not Nature. Slyly indeed 
as, through the negative form of its title, it proposes precisely 
to debate the very notion of nature. We can distinguish two 
opposing discourses in the very important discrepancy of 
axioms defining nature.
On the one hand, certain writers of this issue distinguish the 
human realm from the natural and observe the interaction 
that they developed with each other. If we would transpose 
this into 17th century philosophical debate, this writers follow 
René Descartes who wanted to see men as “masters and 
possessors of nature”. From there, they elaborate a critique of 
the current ideal imaginary of nature by (Western) architects 
and (Western) societies. They argue that the green ubiquity 
in the architectural discourse hides the true ‘nature’ of nature 
which is not fundamentally antagonistic to technology. One 
would wish that, in their discourse, they would reach the level 
of the Werner Herzog’s bitter complaint in the Amazon forest 
during the difficult shooting of Fitzcaraldo, where he evokes 
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external nature, but proposes a terrifying yet superb vision of 
it as the scene of continuous fornication and asphyxiation, 
as an opposite vision opposite to Klaus Kinski’s romanticism 
that sees eroticism in a nature.
On the other hand, some other writers – amongt which you 
find regulars of the Funambulist, Ed Keller, Catherine Ingra-
ham and David Gissen – interpreted the negation of the title 
as a problematic association of words. In their Spinozist read-
ing of the world, these other writers consider nature as the 
only thing that exists and composes all substances. Spinoza 
calls this nature God, and defines it as a non-transcendental 
and infinite substance. Before going any further, I would like 
to quote some propositions of the first chapter of his Ethics 
which establish (and demonstrate) this approach:
Prop. 11. God, or substance consisting of infinite 
attributes, of which each expresses eternal and 
infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
Prop. 14. Besides God no substance can be 
granted or conceived.
Prop. 16. From the necessity of the divine nature 
must follow an infinite number of things in infinite 
ways -- that is, all things that fall within the sphere 
of infinite intellect.
Prop. 18. God is the indwelling and not the tran-
sient cause of all things.
Prop. 29. Nothing in the universe is contingent, 
but all things are conditioned to exist and oper-
ate in a particular manner by the necessity of the 
divine nature.
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Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza (1677) MTSU Phi-
losophy WebWorks Hypertext Edition © 1997
Spinoza uses the name God as an equivalent of nature, but 
one should not be confused by this terminology. As well as 
being used as a camouflage for a pantheist vision of the 
world in a still fundamentally religious world, Spinoza knew 
the Torah in its very details and was able to interpret from it a 
god who was not a creator but rather the creation.
Back to this issue of TARP, the Spinozist vision of nature ar-
ticulated by this second group of writers is a manifesto for 
architecture that registers nature within a non-contingent pro-
cess of interactions between matter and forces, in the exact 
same way that the human body is submitted to and created 
by these interactions.
TARP Not Nature is therefore exemplary in the dialectical ex-
ercise it proposes for the approach to such a loaded notion. 
Rarely does a journal manage to have its contributors vol-
untarily or involuntarily response to each other that as much 
as this issue manages to do, but here, the consolidation or 
the contradiction of one’s argument by another writer makes 
this issue a great toolbox to address the topic of nature and 
non-nature.
.....
Originally published on May 11th 2012
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THE WEIGHT OF THE 
BODY FALLING
Gravity is never more perceptible than when an object falls, 
and when this object is a human body, the visual expres-
siveness of the scene becomes even more dramatic. Photo-
graphs of the body falling probably all owes a lot to the one 
composed by Yves Klein jumping into the void of a Parisian 
street in 1960. Since then, other photographers worked on 
this subject, more or less voluntarily, as we will see.
The photographs of Kerry Skarbakka are very expressive on 
this point. Although his body is always suspended, he suc-
ceeds in translating the weight of the body in his literal mean-
ing: the degree of attraction of the body towards the earth. 
The viewer can inexorably imagine the moment that comes 
next, the collision of the earth and the body, the climax of the 
violence of gravity.
Denis Darzacq uses a similar method but, for better or worse, 
tends to express a feeling of slow motion that adds to the 
aesthetics of the image but reduces this very interesting at-
traction to which the body is subjected. In Darzacq’s photo-
graphs, bodies seem to be forever suspended in the void,  as 
if the notion of weight was not in effect anymore.
Finally, Richard Drew, involuntarily revolutionized this photo-
graphic subject as he managed to photograph one of the 
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most traumatic scenes from September 11st 2001’s attacks 
against the New York World Trade Center: a man who chose 
the void over the flames and fell for long seconds along the 
very linear facade of the towers. This photograph raises a 
lot of questions concerning the definition of art and its limits; 
nevertheless, it expresses the subjectivation of the body to 
gravity like no other work and provokes an intense emotion 
in the viewer who cannot not identify with this body and as-
sociate with it the context in which it has been photographed.
.....
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The Funambulist Pamphlets: Spinoza / 81
15
SPINOZIST COLLISION
The previous section was my first approach of the study of 
the effect of gravity on the human body and its potential ar-
chitectural interpretation. Here, I also want to mention the 
notion of “Landing Sites” (see the cover of The Funambulist 
Pamphlets Volume 8: Arakawa + Madeline Gins) created by 
Arakawa and Gins.
I would like to approach the notion of bodies falling in a Spi-
nozist way, focusing on the notion of collision. The introduc-
tory image of this article is not innocent; I noticed that no 
matter how bad a movie is as far as the scenario or the act-
ing are concerned, I have a strong respect for films that are 
attached to the weights of bodies – body, here, has to be 
understood as a coherent cluster of microscopic particles 
forming a macroscopic ensemble. I am thinking in particu-
lar of the movies directed by Akira Kurosawa, in particular 
The Hidden Fortress and of the more recent 13 Assassins by 
Takeshi Miike. Horses galloping in the mud, never far from 
sliding and falling, human bodies falling in the water or on 
the earth, and of course the instrumental steel of the swords 
that resonates when clashing, are as many indicators of the 
reality of two bodies colliding with each other.
Spinoza, is the philosopher to read in order to understand 
and interpret such collisions. He is the thinker of two bodies 
interacting materially with each other, an event of which colli-
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sion is the most violent and expressive paradigm.
Bodies involved in a given interaction affect each other. A 
caress on the skin, or the simple action of stepping on a 
hard ground are often not intense enough to have a visually 
striking affect. Nevertheless this affect on BOTH bodies ex-
ists and the collision of those two bodies allows it to be vis-
ible to the human eye. Films that express objects’ weight are 
therefore a celebration of Spinoza’s philosophy and so are 
architectures which consider the human body as affected by 
them, and vice versa. 
.....
Originally published on September 26th 2011
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THE WEIGHT OF THE BODY 
DANCING BY PINA BAUSCH AS 
FILMED BY WIM WENDERS
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 11: CINEMA]
It has been said many times that the most beautiful ballets 
are the ones that makes us forget the weight of the dancers’ 
bodies. With Pina Bausch, on the contrary, dance becomes 
a vehicle of celebration of this weight in its interaction with 
itself, the others, and the environment. The film Pina by Wim 
Wenders (2011) is remarkable in this regard. It offers to the 
spectator another point of view on four of the German cho-
reographer’s main pieces (The Rite of Spring, Café Muller, 
Kontakthoh and Vollmond) as well as introducing her dancers 
in various open landscapes thus perpetuating the emphasis 
on the relationship dance creates with a terrain.
This new point of view is highly interesting as it focuses on de-
tails that are almost imperceptible from the audience’s tradi-
tional situation. However, all those details are what composes 
the atmosphere of P.Bausch’s ballet, and they are beautifully 
emphasized by W.Wenders. The sound of the bodies, in par-
ticular, is fascinating, whether they inhale, breathe, run, fall 
on the floor or hit it. Bodies are celebrated both in their power 
and in their fragility. There is a violence in Pina Bauch’s work 
that is fascinating and frightening in its crudeness. The film 
recounts well this dimension of dance, whether it is by those 
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two female bodies which repeatedly encounter the power of 
a wall in Café Muller, or the group of women ritually hitting 
their bodies in Le Sacre du Printemps, or else the rope that 
prevents a young girl from escaping of the room, or again, 
the couple, in Café Muller, who can’t stop repeating the same 
action over and over between embrace and fall. Each time, 
the sound produced by those bodies reminds us of their 
weight, i.e. their factor of attraction for gravity, and shocks us 
by its coldness.
Depending of the matter of which it is composed, the en-
vironment reacts more or less visually to those encounters. 
Earth, sand and water are found regularly in the movie as 
examples of such visible interactions. Indeed, these materi-
als embody expressively the effect that the environment has 
on the body and vice versa.
Following illustrations are all extracted from Pina by Wim 
Wenders (2012)
.....
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SPINOZIST GRAVITY: THE 
REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
OLD & NEW STAR WARS
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 11: CINEMA]
First of all, I would like to say that this is not an indictment 
ofthe three “new” episodes (I, II & III) of Star Wars; on the 
contrary, I think that these films brings something extremely 
interesting to the saga, which is the retroactive construction 
of a myth (I still remember my shiver in the theater at the 
end of Star Wars III, when we observe the birth of Darth Va-
der) that managed intelligently to explain how the Jedi went 
from faithful servants of a democratic Republic to rebel when 
the same regime turned into a permanent autocratic State of 
Emergency.
However, one thing that I find superb in the three first epi-
sodes (4, 5 & 6) and that makes all the difference between 
the episodes from the 1970-1980’s and those from the 2000’s 
is the ground.
In fact, the original Star Wars were shot in several places in 
the world, which allowed various and rich landscapes to ex-
press several planets’ specificity. On the contrary, the new 
series principally used computer generated landscapes (ex-
cept for some scenes in Naboo where we can recognize Se-
ville or Como). I want to emphaisze that my argument is not 
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in favor of “realism” or credibility of the movie. It is almost 
the opposite, actually: George Lucas in the 1970’s did not 
necessarily dispose of the same techniques he has now, and 
some shots of the original films are charming in their clumsy 
attempt to set characters and aircraft in a landscape that is 
clearly dissociated from them…
What really makes this difference is what I would call gravity, 
but what could perhaps be named some other way. What I 
mean by that is the fact that bodies are attracted to the center 
of the earth (and presumably in Star Wars to the center of any 
planet) and therefore have a weight that provokes their con-
tact with the ground. This contact always has material reper-
cussions, some dust is lifted, some snow is squashed, some 
branches on the ground crack (in the Episode VI, Han Solo is 
even betrayed by one of them), etc. The three new episodes 
also have those noises, of course, but for some reason, the 
viewer does not buy it, gravity is not transcribed in the right 
way. When in the old movies, one can hear the infinitely small 
noise of a worm or of snow melting in contact with human 
heat, what one can hear in the new movies, is the simple, 
precise and cold sound of a noise reproduced in studio.
This problem is eminently philosophical, as Star Wars is 
definitely a movie that, because of its pantheist theology 
manifested by the Force, wants inherently to celebrate the 
continuous arrangement and rearrangement of bodies of the 
universe. In fact, if one forgets the stupid and contradictory 
allusions made in the Episode I to some obscure “midi-chlori-
an“, one can definitely associate this notion of Force with the 
Spinozist philosophy that conceives God not anymore as a 
transcendental creator but rather as the immanent creature in 
its entirety. In this vision, the bodies of the universe compose 
good (or joyful) or bad (or sad) relations with each other, as 
explained by Deleuze in his class about Spinoza with his 
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example of the wave (see chapter 8). Deleuze chooses the 
wave to illustrate what this notion of good or bad relations 
means. A human body who never encounters the ocean, will 
indeed suffer from the wave which pushes and slaps him 
(her), whereas a swimmer or a surfer will know how to com-
pose the infinitely small particles of his (her) body to com-
pose an harmonious relationship with the wave and use the 
latter to be carried by it.
In a similar (and rather angelic) way, Star Wars introduce the 
Force as the current that links all bodies together. The good 
side of the Force exalts a harmonious relationship between 
all of those bodies, while the dark side attempts a continuous 
destruction of relations between bodies. There would prob-
ably be something interesting to write about the relations be-
tween the characters of the saga here, but I would like to con-
tinue about the relations between the ground and the various 
bodies present in the films.
The fact that gravity -- which is fully part of the Force whether 
one composes good relations with it and not -- is present in 
the old episodes of the movie clearly expresses a celebration 
of the force. Bodies encounter other bodies and a reaction 
between both is provoked, whether obvious and loud (the 
Empire’s laserproof giant walkers walking on the snow) or 
much more subtle (the droids walking and rolling in Tatoine’s 
desert’s dunes). Unfortunately, this reaction does not exist in 
the new episodes, as the ground is often a studio ground and 
the noise (proof of its encounter) produced is artificial.
If we want to see Star Wars as the orchestration of encoun-
ters of bodies within the frame of this Spinozist God/Nature 
called here the Force, we must acknowledge the importance 
of gravity and the reaction that it provokes between bodies. 
By giving up this notion and filming most of the scenes of 
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the new movies in the studio (for reasons that would prob-
ably be interesting to explore) and composing landscape like 
paintings rather than environments, Georges Lucas betrayed 
the original spirit, if not theology, that he spent so much time 
to elaborate in his first approach to the saga. By doing so, 
he unfortunately offered more arguments to the numerous 
people who still see in Star Wars a grotesque film for “geaks” 
when it is, in fact, a wonderful monument of our contempo-
rary mythology, to which science fiction seems to be one of 
the rare disciplines to contribute.
.....
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SPIKE LEE’S DOLLY SHOT: 
THE INEXORABILITY 
OF IMMANENCE
[also in The Funambulist Pamphlet Volume 11: CINEMA]
It is interesting to envision Art History in terms of inventions. 
Of course,  one could argue that a work of art is not simply 
about inventing new techniques but also being able to use 
the techniques in the content of this work. However, we could 
approach the problem in a Spinozist way that does not distin-
guish between the soul and the body, and therefore between 
the means and the essence. Studying Art History by focusing 
on inventions is interesting to the extent that it allows to com-
municate new emotions.
I am interested in observing more specifically what Spike Lee 
invented for Cinema. The principle is pretty simple: filming 
an actor standing on the dolly on which the camera is set, in 
a back traveling shot that makes the actor immobile but the 
setting around him or her moves. The main effect produced 
is the feeling that the actor is floating and moved by an ex-
ternal force.
With this process, Spike Lee manages to communicate dif-
ferent emotions that take over the character whose body has 
no choice but to obey to an irresistible force that pushes him 
(her) forward.
The Funambulist Pamphlets: Spinoza / 95
In Malcolm X, the character of Denzel Washington is pushed 
by the fatal history when he goes to give the speech dur-
ing which he will be assassinated. In Clockers, a young drug 
dealer is moved by its loss of control of a situation that drives 
the kid that helps him to shoot a man in front of him. In the 
25th Hour, both Anna Paquin and Philip Seymour Hoffman’s 
characters are subjected to a state of drunkenness that 
brings her to seduce him and him to kiss her despite the 
fact that she is his 17 years old student. Eventually, in Inside 
Man, Denzel Washington, as a hostage negotiator, calm for 
the whole first part of the movie, is moved by a virulent anger 
when one of the hostages for whom he is responsible been 
shot by bank robbers.
There are more Spike Lee’s movies using this process (Mo’ 
Better Blues, School Daze and Crooklyn) but I would like to 
focus on the four films I evoked. The speed is interesting, 
as it differentiates between the fast intensity of a profound 
emotion such as Denzel Washington’s anger in Inside Man 
and the slow and inexorable fate that brings Malcolm X to his 
death. The notion of fate is important here, and I believe that 
it should not be considered in the usual terms. Fate, here, is 
not to be understood as a trick used by Spike Lee to intro-
duce a deus ex machina in his films that would allow him to 
trigger an event in an absolute transcendental way. No, in my 
understanding, the Dolly Shot occurs because the whole nar-
rative before it constructed the circumstances that make this 
scene inexorable. In other words, the force that I was evoking 
earlier is not a divine force that would influence the plot, but 
rather the implacable logical conclusion of the sum of events 
that built up the story so far.
Spike Lee’s Dolly Shots are therefore a good illustration of 
Paul Klee’s famous phrase: “Art does not represent the vis-
ible; rather, it makes things visible.” (1920). In fact, those 
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shots are not reproducing any real situation, but rather envi-
sion the inexorability of our behaviors based on the sum of 
circumstances that bring them in situation. 
Following illustrations are respectively extracted from Mal-
colm X (1992), 25th Hour (x2) (2002), Clockers (1995) & The 
Inside Man (2006) by Spike Lee.
.....
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THE FUNAMBULIST: a blog written and edited by Léopold Lambert. 
It finds its name in the consideration for architecture’s representative 
medium, the line, and its philosophical and political power when it 
materializes and subjectivizes bodies. If the white page represents 
a given milieu — a desert for example — and one (an architect, for 
example) comes to trace a line on it, (s)he will virtually split this same 
milieu into two distinct impermeable parts through its embodiment, 
the wall. The Funambulist, also known as a tightrope walker, is the 
character who, somehow, subverts this power by walking on the line.
CENTER FOR TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIA, Parsons The New 
School for Design: a transdisciplinary media research initiative bridg-
ing design and the social sciences, and dedicated to the exploration 
of the transformative potential of emerging technologies upon the 
foundational practices of everyday life across a range of settings.
PUNCTUM BOOKS: spontaneous acts of scholarly combustion is 
an open-access and print-on-demand independent publisher dedi-
cated to radically creative modes of intellectual inquiry and writing 
across a whimsical para-humanities assemblage. punctum books 
seeks to curate the open spaces of writing or writing-as-opening, the 
crucial tiny portals on whose capacious thresholds all writing prop-
erly and improperly takes place. Pricking, puncturing, perforating = 
publishing in the mode of an unconditional hospitality and friend-
ship, making space for what Eve Sedgwick called “queer little gods” 
– the “ontologically intermediate and teratological figures” of y/our 
thought.We seek to pierce and disturb the wednesdayish, business-
as-usual protocols of both the generic university studium and its in-
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